Democratization from Below: Civil Society in Tajikistan

Abstract

Over a decade ago, Fisher (2013) explored the role of NGOs in South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina. Despite continuing global autocratic trends since then, South Africa and Argentina have remained vibrant democracies with strong civil societies. Tajikistan, in contrast, remains autocratic, and civil society has apparently weakened in recent years. However, at the grassroots level, a combination of traditional grassroots organizations and internet organizing provides a more complex picture of the relationships between local participation, ties with other civil society organizations, democratization, and development. The purpose of this paper is to highlight both these relationships and the contrast between local democratization and national autocracy.

Introduction

From 1973, when the “Carnation Revolution” overthrew the fascist Estado Novo in Portugal, until the early 21st Century, democratization had a good run in much of the world. By the turn of the century, however, political scientists had already begun to write about the “global democratic recession”, a trend that has continued. Between 2005 and 2020 the number of “free” countries declined from 89 to 82 according to Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores), while the number of “part free” countries (58-59) remained stable.

Based on extensive in-country fieldwork between 2005 and 2008, Fisher (2013) charted the emerging trends by investigating the contributions of civil society to democratization in two flawed democracies (South Africa and Argentina) and one autocracy (Tajikistan) on three different continents. She found that in all three countries, both intermediary democratization NGOs and grassroots organizations were strong and often connected with each other. Argentina and South Africa have since continued to benefit from lively civil societies, including continuing development of provincial civil society networks. In the absence of continuing democratization, Tajik civil society survives, albeit with altered contours, as described below.

The primary focus of this paper is participation at the grassroots level in Tajikistan, where traditional grassroots organizations, newer grassroots organizations, and internet organizing co-exist and can impact democratization. The paper also provides a  complex and updated picture of the relationships between local participation and other civil society organizations.  Both local participation and other civil society relationships can impact the relationship between democratization and development. The overarching purpose of the paper is to highlight the continuing contrast between local democratization and national autocracy.

In this paper I use Robert Dahl’s (1972) defining characteristics of democracy, based on: 1) Law-Based Civil Liberties; 2) Political Participation; 3) Loyal Opposition: as well as Fisher’s (2013) addition of 4) Democratic Political Culture. Democratization is thus defined as the long-term process advancing these characteristics.

Civil society is understood here as “markets, associations and a sphere of public debate.” (Perez Diaz, 1993: 56). Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) encompass many kinds of nonprofit organizations, including hospitals, theaters, religious institutions, some media, and universities, as well as trade unions, professional associations, other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations (GROs). NGOs, in turn, fall into two categories:

1) International NGOs (INGOs)  based in a foreign country, or network of countries.

2) Intermediary NGOs, including national advocacy and welfare groups and Grassroots Support Organizations (GRSOs) working in communities other than their own. GRSOs may be provincial or national and primarily focused on democratization, development, or both. Fisher (2013) used the term “democratization NGOs” in order to group some national advocacy organizations such as those working on human rights with GRSOs.

Grassroots organizations (GROs) work in their own communities and are also known as CBOs (community-based organizations).

Background on Tajikistan

“We are at the very beginning of a great thing.” — Shamssidin Karimov

Tajikistan is among the most remittance-dependent countries in the world. A million migrants working in Russia remit 3 billion dollars, a third of Tajikistan’s GDP (Bertelsman Foundation, 2020). Migration leads to family dysfunction, increasing poverty, and high rates of domestic violence, all of which are worsened by a high birth rate (UNDP, 2021). The situation deteriorated with the Pandemic since many migrant workers lost their jobs in Russia and had to return home.

Another 30% of the GDP comes from the drug trade, including opium and heroin…smuggled into the country each year from Afghanistan, either for local consumption or for transfer to Russia and Europe. Despite the Tajik government’s policy against illicit drug trafficking in cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations, trafficking, and cross-border violence continue to increase (Shamsiddin Karimov, personal communication, June 27, 2021). Tajikistan also relies on cotton exports (as well as gold and aluminum), but the farming sector depends on monopolies acting as loan sharks. One is owned by the son-in-law of President Emomali Rahmon.

On the positive side, Tajikistan does not suffer from transnational Islamic extremism or terrorist attacks. It has been a crossroads of religious diversity since ancient times, and “people practicing Islam on a daily basis, venerate Sufi shrines, as well as the spirits of nature.” (Zharkevitch, 2010: 25). The corpus of Muslim literature includes inherited lyrics and stories written in Old Persian, which is the root of the Tajik language (Nourshanov and Bleuer, 2013:235). The political impact of Tajikistan’s moderate brand of Islam waned after the Tajik Civil War (1992-1995), fought partly on religious differences. Motivated by the need for peace, villagers became less likely to support even the Islamic Renaissance Party, which represented a moderate version of Sunnism, and was, in any case, banned by the Rahmon regime in 2015.

Despite continuing religious and political repression, a recent detente in the previously hostile relations with Uzbekistan may contribute to this generally positive picture. Moreover, the country continues to benefit from the social investments and administrative cohesion of the Soviet period, “which increases stability.” (Zharkevich, 2010: 43). Simply put, Tajikistan is not a fragile state. Seventy-one percent of the population has access to clean drinking water, and literacy is almost at 100%. Life Expectancy is over 70, although malnutrition among children is a stubborn 17% (UNDP,  2020).

Tajikistan is not, however, a strong state. The Constitutional Court is inactive, with anti-corruption cases confined to the lower courts. Tajikistan ranks 149 of 180 countries on Transparency International’s corruption index and corruption is closely tied to the authoritarian government (https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021) Anja Mihr (2022) of the OSCE Academy (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in characterizing Central Asia as a whole, observes that “It is impossible for any ordinary citizen without ties to organized crime to run for office…except for a handful of women and people with disabilities to show to international donors.”

Tajikistan’s score on democracy has fallen in recent years (Freedom House: 2020).  As a nepotistic autocracy, the ruling family has banned the opposition, jailed human rights leaders, censored media, restricted religious groups, and clamped down on civil society. In recent years Tajikistan has boycotted the OSCE meetings on human rights. Public meetings and assemblies are prohibited, and the press is increasingly restricted. In November 2021 the regime intervened militarily against people in Badakhshan who protested a killing. Both the protests and the military response by the regime have escalated since then and the internet has been cut off in that region.

Another dark corner of this picture is what has happened to the media since 2006. While associations are episodically targeted in Tajikistan, another sector of civil society, the “sphere of public debate” is under direct and sustained attack. Asia Plus, an independent press outlet, has been blocked since 2018. Facebook and YouTube were blocked after they published an interview with an opposition leader (CIVICUS, 2020). It is unclear how long NGOs such as the National Association of Independent Media of Tajikistan and the Coalition of Female Journalists of Tajikistan will be able to resist (Buriev, 2020: 4).

At the same time, the state has failed in its attempt to double the price of internet service.  After an authentic though rather small protest of 200 people, Rahmon backed down and canceled the price increase in 2019 (https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-caves-to-public-pressure-on-internet-price-rise-sparking-glee), perhaps testifying to his political weakness. Also, as we will see below, the spread of the internet continues, particularly in rural areas.

Restrictions on civil society are not confined to the media or even human rights organizations. A  2007 law required re-registration for all NGOs, and some of them alleged that the Ministry of Justice had extorted bribes during the registration process  (Ewoh et al, 2012, p. 6). Official repression increased after 2018, with requirements to post annual reports to combat  “terrorist financing,” often aimed at human rights activists and advocacy organizations.  Madrassas are closed and Christian churches are persecuted (Swerdlow, 2020). Organizations avoid requesting permits for demonstrations because official approval is required. Taxes are imposed on websites and requirements to post financial reports are onerous for small organizations. In 2020,  penalties for not registering CSOs increased fourfold and the complexities of “re-registering” continued. What is more, a majority of civil society professionals at the intermediary level have left the sector. The government promotes so-called grassroots movements such as ” Vanguard” to co-opt student opposition. Amid all this, Zuhra Halimova, former head of the Open Society Foundation in Tajikistan observes  “Independent GROs are in better shape [than intermediary NGOs] — the government relies on them.”

In addition, Halimova continues, “As of 2021, with only 4 official regulators in the regulatory office, the government lacked sufficient capacity to enforce civil society regulations. NGOs have to report all grants, but the Ministry of Justice has only a few analysts to review 3000 financial reports.”

Moreover, state corruption is massive and systemic. As Shamsiddin Karimov suggests, “Corruption softens repression,” even though it makes democratization more difficult.

Both bureaucratic weakness and corruption should become amendments to discussions of repression, such as those that categorize authoritarian state interactions with CSOs as “legitimizing discourses, repression, and co-optation” (Toepler et al, 2020: 649). Some NGOs are, of course, targeted. But, overall, CSO staff are more likely to be harassed than jailed, according to Halimova, “A new law has loosened the concept of linking foreign grants to being a foreign agent…it is not a black and white situation.”

“There are also divisions within the government”, according to Karimov, “between officials who understand the role of civil society and those who equate democratization with instability.” Although government ministries sometimes bring in CSOs, providing them with a platform and financial support, government corruption continues, and INGOs may contribute to it through what Karimov calls “inadequate vetting of their local staffs for corruption,” an internal governance failure known from other contexts (eg, Prakash, 2019).

Since the Pandemic, the contrast between the treatment of the media, on the one hand, and CSOs, on the other, has actually increased. The government announced fines of up to $1000 for false information, mainly targeted at the media, but uses GROs to distribute PPE and humanitarian aid to health workers. (Buriev, 2020). Effective civil society COVID policies also attracted government support, as in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAR). The head of the region, Edgor Fayzov, former chair of the Aga Khan Foundation, used his civil society experience to design and implement the regional government’s pandemic policies (Buriev, 2020).

Grassroots Political Participation

As noted above, the primary focus of this paper is political participation, and, more specifically, grassroots organizations and movements that promote democratic participation in the course of working on local development and providing services to their own communities, despite an autocratic national government. Because GROs are connected to the larger civil society, the ties and interactions of GROs with each other and with GRSOs are central to the analysis, along with interactions with local and national governments and international donors which may be initiated for either economic or participatory purposes. Recent evidence from Tajikistan supports the following:

1)  Local political activity can continue as a wellspring of democratization, despite authoritarian governance at the top. The evidence presented below suggests that two out of the four defining characteristics of democracy seem to be advancing at the local level in Tajikistan-political participation and democratic political culture, based on participation in GROs and the surprisingly positive impact of the internet, described below. Advances in law-based civil liberties are more dependent on programs initiated by intermediary NGOs, and loyal opposition is probably the most difficult of the four characteristics, not even obvious in more advanced countries. 

2) There is potential both for survival and continued learning among civil society actors networking at the local, regional, and national levels in Tajikistan, which can support grassroots participation. This has also been advanced by increased rural access to the internet.

3) The Tajik evidence supports the idea that the causal relationships between participation and socio-economic development work in both directions.

Bottom-Up Participation as a Wellspring of Democracy

Of course, democratization can be promoted by governmental and political as well as civil society actors at many levels. That said,  some  practitioners have described civil society as a whole as the ‘wellspring of democracy and development” which can evolve and survive over time in altered forms (https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1738_ww_human_development_report_undp_072502_5.pdf) 

However, local participation is often the most powerful source of democratic change. Although the major focus of Fisher’s (2013) analysis was intermediary democratization NGOs, it included a great deal about their essential ties to GROs and the importance of grassroots participation to overall democratization.

Taiwan provides a clear historical example of bottom-up participation being the wellspring, quite literally, of democratization. According to Uphoff (1986: 218) Taiwan’s grassroots irrigators associations and farmers associations, each with their own technical staff, contributed to democratization at the national level.

Wells and wellsprings have to be maintained, however, and that depends on the development of a sense of political efficacy. A sense of political efficacy can translate into political participation, contributing to democratization, even at higher levels. By observing Inter-American Foundation projects in the field, Albert Hirschman (1984:42-57)  found that people with a bent for collective action and social change often failed in their first attempts, but political energy then re-emerged, although not necessarily for the same cause. Collective action by Colombian campesinos failed when agrarian reform was not implemented in 1975, but the same group later organized successful fishing cooperatives. Hirschman described this process as “the conservation and transformation of social energy.” He noted, however, that the failure to perceive it was itself destructive. If followed by success, participatory patterns and a sense of political efficacy are deepened. (Hirschman, 1984: 42-57)

Local Political Activity in Tajikistan

Despite repression, local participation also remains the wellspring of democratic hopes in Tajikistan. One reason for this is that the state depends on local organizations for policy implementation since the latter are often more capable than the state in responding to socioeconomic problems (Ewoh et al,  2012). This capacity, based on past efforts, contributes to the survival of traditional civil society in rural areas.

A second reason for its survival is that 70% of the country is rural. Mahallahs  (local councils) as well as local governments (Jamoats) remain important to local decision-making (Bertelsman, 2020). However, Mahallahs elect their own leaders rather than acquiesce to their appointment by the Jamoat. 

Thirdly, there is considerable evidence that Mahallas have adapted to new political circumstances and challenges, as described by Hirschman. Indeed, the preservation and transformation of social energy are demonstrated by the survival of local organizing capacity under both Soviet and post-Soviet authoritarian rule. Under the Soviets, Mahallas mediated local conflicts in the absence of state-sanctioned professional associations. Some Mahallas were reincarnated as collective farms (kolkhoz), “where they organized service provision, local infrastructure maintenance and dispute resolution” (Frezier, 2015: 281). Others were organized in city apartments, because of the Soviet emphasis on voluntary work. With competition from these “social institutions of tradition,” however, Moscow had difficulties setting up a network of informers, because “an ethnocultural mentality based on traditional patrimonialism, popular Islam and regionalism had survived unscathed.” (Nourzhanov and Bleuer, 2013: 108; 345) During the civil war following the end of Soviet rule, Tajikistan’s Mahallas established a rough form of local governance and distributed international humanitarian aid.

Mahallahs today continue promoting traditions of deliberative talk, which often lead to community development projects. In the absence of viable opposition parties, this strengthens public debate, despite official repression of independent media. Public talk followed by public work can be durable. Public talk also called traditional public deliberation, exists in many cultures. In Tajikistan, public talk occurs not only in Mahallas but also in choikona  (tea houses), gasbar, where young people congregate, mushkilkusho (conversations among women), and alavkhona (fair house or house of fire). Fair houses have existed since before the 7th Century. Common dinners held in mosques are often followed by deliberations that last for days and often lead to activating the centuries-old tradition of the hashar system of voluntary community work.  At the same time, however, clans and hierarchies also persist at the local level and may limit local accountability and transparency  (Zharkevich, 2010,  pp. 18, 37).

Armed with accurate information on each household, the estimated 5000 Mahallas in Tajikistan today collect money, including from international donors, and organize development projects such as local bridge construction or repair. In recent years “Mahallahs have become more professional and the government relies on them.”

Mahallas are not councils of elders, but they have elected leaders and real coercive power to solve conflicts, often based on traditional Islamic concepts of social justice. They also cope with emergencies. Many villages also have councils of elders, called Shura Asakal (Fisher, 2013:120-121). Mahallas often consult with them, especially to organize hashar, or special events.

Adaptability and taking on new tasks also apply to other kinds of GROs. In the Pamir Mountains local citizen associations called Kishlak or Guar promote law and order, local autonomy, and local rights. Other traditional GROs include water user’s associations and patriarchal clan organizations (avlod) that provide assistance with housing and employment based on the high trust levels within extended families. Given this adaptability and the support of several major INGOs, it is not surprising that the total number of  Tajik GROs may have increased in recent years. There are 1400 GROs officially registered by the government, but with 5000 Mahallahs (unofficial) and other GROs, it is difficult to know how many are active. And by defining civil society to include markets, micro-enterprises promoted by INGOs could also be included in this count.

Learning Within Civil Society: An Overview

Hirschmann’s concept of the preservation and transformation of social energy applies not only to local organizational capacity, micro-enterprises, and deliberative traditions, but also to horizontal grassroots networks uniting different communities, intermediary NGOs, and even INGOs. This section focuses on how the connections between GROs and other civil society organizations in Tajikistan contribute to democratization.

Where is Tajikistan on the long, hard slog toward democratization? Even in the early 2000s, Tajikistan was classified as “not free”, although it scored relatively higher on the Freedom House index than any other Central Asian country then.  As Shamsiddin Karimov told me in 2006, “We have more freedom than democracy,” and, despite even lower international democracy ratings, he suggested essentially the same thing in 2021. The survival of a degree of freedom and the survival of Tajik civil society are closely linked. Civil society organizations of all kinds continue to learn about participation, democracy, and development from each other.

Here we will explore the strength of each sector of civil society in relation to their ties to GROs. For GROs, learning how to adapt and survive often begins with horizontal ties to each other.  Secondly, civil society in rural areas now includes a novel “sphere of public debate”, the internet.

Grassroots Networks

GROs are often based on patriarchal ties, which can lead to competition or even hostility among them, and horizontal connections among GROs (sometimes called social movements)  can be difficult. Nevertheless, regionally-based grassroots ties have emerged in Kulob, the Pamirs, and the central part of the country, although not in the North.

According to Karimov, “These are not umbrella organizations! But they are regionally active… There are [approximately] 105 Social Unions for the Development of Village Organizations (SUDVOS)  and 11 Associations of SUDVOs in Tajikistan. SUDVOS are not traditional organizations…although some of their member organizations may be. They are not intermediary NGOs either. [they are]…community-based organizations, [with] many local members…a type of GRO network, with a leading GRO that gets outside support, including technical assistance.” One SUDVO, supported by the World Food Program (WPF)  works in 7 villages to improve food security in four Gorno Badakha Districts by increasing water access and growing vegetables. (facebook.com/asudvo/)

Parviz Mullajanov observed that “Trade occurs and development ideas are shared among members in some regional Mahallah networks, as well as in other networks created by local activists, with international support…however, the numbers of GROs [ and networks] are down, even for those supported by the Aga Khan Foundation”.

Mahallah networks, despite their autonomy from Jamoats, have demonstrated their adaptability through cooperation with regional governments. A group of Mahallahs in Dushanbe built a gas pipeline because of a shortage of cooking fuel and turned to TASIF (Tajik Association of Social Investment Funds) for help. Members now have natural gas in their homes. Spurred by this success, the Mahallas created a micro-projects committee, which has improved water systems, constructed an electric main, and supported low-income families.

Local civil society ties to Jamoats have been limited by the declining autonomy of larger regional governments in Badakshan and the Rasht Valley,  which previously enjoyed some autonomy. Jamoat leaders have been replaced with regime loyalists and a legal provision allowing municipal councils to design their own budgets and elect their own leaders has not been consistently implemented.

In spite of a lack of funding, both Jamoats and local GROs continue to promote local participation in other areas. (Ewoh et al, 2012, pp. 7-8). Mahallas also assist Jamoats by attracting funding, resolving land disputes, and preventing the re-emergence of warlords (Zharkevich, 2010, p. 35). It is more likely that Jamoats learn from GROs than the other way around.

Grassroots Networking and the Internet

As Zuhra Halimova observed, “At the grassroots level there has been a striking increase in a new dimension-virtual space, which has begun to dramatically increase the adaptability of civil society.”  As a “sphere of public debate,” the internet is expensive, but Halimova views an Open Society Foundation’s $3.5 million investment in rural internet access as “strikingly successful.”

This “new dimension” has led to the creation of new kinds of GROs that, in turn, create more grassroots networks. Some networks organize around environmental issues such as cleaning up plastic. “Most of these are led by young people, but they cooperate with other community members and Mahallas for special events and to maintain traditional culture. Their digital connections…also enable them to become varied kinds of CSOs,” according to Halimova. “Although civil society is not suppressed the way political parties are, human rights issues are difficult. Yet there are shared values, at localities— cities and towns. Even Mahallahs now use social media.”

The internet has, in effect, multiplied the impact of traditional associations, promoted their networks and created many small spheres of public debate. Moreover, it has added new  “markets” to rural civil society. As elsewhere, people create small online businesses and enhance economic ties with each other. As Halimova observed, “Among such networks are unions of handicraft producers and groups promoting tourist opportunities such as local Bed and Breakfasts.”

The internet has, in effect, multiplied the impact of traditional associations, promoted their networks, and created many small spheres of public debate. Moreover, it has added new  “markets”  to rural civil society. As elsewhere, people create small online businesses and enhance economic ties with each other. As Halimova observed, “Among such networks are unions of handicraft producers and groups promoting tourist opportunities such as local Bed and Breakfasts. “

Traditional GROs “have responded positively to  internet organizing, while maintaining their ability to promote local engagement and maintain traditional culture.” Both the traditional and the new internet cultures promote and enable associational life and a sphere of public debate. And now, with the addition of local markets tied to the internet, the freedoms provided by local civil society are very much alive.

Grassroots Support Organizations: The Intermediary Level

The universal problem that limits what Intermediary NGOs and GROs can learn from each other was expressed by a South African interviewed in 2006: “There are amazing small organizations working in rural areas and urban townships…Promoting participation is the most crucial task of all intermediary NGOs…but it is not easy. You can’t say, ‘let me help you do it better’, because then you destroy it.” (Fisher, 2013: 89)

Despite this impediment, Tajik democratization NGOs led by women were challenging the legal system and promoting law-based civil liberties in 2006. Women headed 16 of the 29 democratization NGOs interviewed, concentrating on such issues as bringing domestic violence perpetrators to justice, judicial reform, and international sex trafficking legislation.   They also supported Mahallahs that were beginning to include women.

Despite such encouraging signs, Tajikistan’s civil society in 2006 was characterized by institutional weakness, limiting what CSOs could learn from each other. Although women were instrumental in building ties to GROs, democratization NGOs, ironically, sometimes lagged behind environmental NGOs in the strength of their grassroots ties. Many democratization NGOs interviewed in 2006 for Fisher’s (2013) book are still active, but key activists have moved on to different topics and issues at the grassroots level.

That said, a majority of the 14,000 CSOs of all kinds in the country remain inactive. Only 2886 intermediary NGOs are officially registered by the Ministry of Justice. Despite work with beneficiaries, “a majority…do not create a social base for their activities and most are concentrated in Dushanbe and Khujand.” Many are service providers supporting government projects and are less likely to partner with GROs (Bertelsman, 2020).

Human rights have, however, provided an organizing principle for national/local connections.  In 2016, according to Halimova, “an inclusive moment…was responsible for Tajikistan’s adoption of the UN’s human rights convention, and some of the resulting policy coalitions have continued…NGOs  publicly say they will not tolerate  suppression  and mobilize their  global contacts against it.” Democratization NGOs sponsor human rights classes online, “which are very popular, even at the local level.” Whether related or not to this, freedom of speech has also increased at the local level.

Women continue to lead many democratization NGOs in Tajikistan. The League of Women Lawyers, responsible for Tajikistan’s law on human trafficking is “still hard at work on this issue.” In 2018 a coalition of 39 NGOs, including many working in rural areas, produced an impressive, scholarly report on discrimination against women covering a wide range of topics, full of specific policy proposals. One NGO signatory, Ghamkhori, has a history of promoting legislation on violence against women with the cooperation of GROs, and their lawyers have won many cases (Freizer, 2015). A majority of the newer GROs such as 2600 savings groups supported by the AKF and by GRSOs have women’s committees that work on cooperative labor projects and the number of women members of Mahallahs continues to increase.

How or whether this will influence government policy remains to be seen. As Mullajanov observed, “Some human rights NGOs are used by the government to provide cover for their dealings with international actors.” On the other hand, national-level projects such as The Tajikistan National NGO Association’s sponsorship of workshops with political parties could support local democratization (Karimov, 2019).

Other national movements include individual participants from rural areas, and, according to Halimova:

“One of these focuses on children with disabilities and their parents, including many poor people. Labor migrants in Russia, while exploited by the authorities, are organized and make demands for civic space. Some of them have funded grassroots networks that include retired people.” 

More recently, the Pandemic has had a positive impact on strengthening ties within civil society. An NGO called Peshraft delivered 14,000 kits of humanitarian aid through GROs by mobilizing its online “subscribers” (including Tajik pop stars) through Telegram, to support poorer Tajiks with help from both the Yovar retail chain and taxi drivers. Fourteen other NGOs and foundations raised 1 million somoni  (approximately $100,000),  doubled by Peshraft’s corporate partners to cover the entire country (Buriev, 2020).

The Pandemic also pushed an NGO called the Office of Civil Freedoms to launch a fundraising and information campaign on elderly rights. The Public Council for Civil Society Assistance to Police Reform Initiatives unites human rights activists and a coalition of NGOs. The Civil Society Coalition Against Torture and Lawlessness focuses on public awareness about legal issues and the Pandemic (Buriev, 2020).

A second, relatively recent factor is the continuing independence of intermediary NGOs. “Fines imposed by the government for false information are now widely denounced”, according to Karimov. He also pointed to open discussions between the NGO Association of Tajikistan, parliamentarians, and the Ministry of Justice. “We are in transition because the legal environment has improved and NGOs are very active. The internet makes it possible to speak freely. My own organization [the NGO Association of Tajikistan] has 200 members working on agriculture, human rights, and youth. A major reason for this is increased professionalization and knowledge of the community level.” In other words, intermediary NGOs, although they face major challenges, are tied, not just to each other, but also to GROs.

Although less than half of intermediary NGOs are major national players, NGOs have become more active as the fears generated by the Tajik Civil War recede into the past.  Increasing cooperation among all kinds of CSOs has also increased relationships with the private sector and the government.

In addition to GRSOs, professional associations such as the League of Women Lawyers, the Lawyers Union, the Business Union, and the Consumer’s Union are politically active and sometimes connect with GROs (Zharkevich, 2010, p. 44). They do not confront the regime directly, but rather focus on the laws, practices, and policies that underlie these connections.

Even though there is always a risk that elites will capture the benefits of local organizing by outside CSOs, this is less likely in areas most affected by the civil war such as Khatlon, where people learned to support themselves (Zharkevich. 2010,p. 24).

The degree of local civil society empowerment also depends on  a “pro-poor [government] bureaucracy.” (Wood and Mamani Vargas, 2016) This seems highly unlikely in Tajikistan, although civil society partnerships continue and they can gain power when they include international NGOS.

International NGOs

A major challenge faced by Tajik civil society is the decline in financial support from the European Commission, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), and even from some INGOs.  Overall, foreign funding for civil society declined by about 10% in 2018, while Tajik government support actually increased to 17% of the total. The United Nations provides 39% of CSO grants and  US AID 24%. Although there are only a few INGO supporters of civil society in Tajikistan, they have a disproportionate impact.

Despite complaints about corruption in international NGOs, the 2006 study respondents commented on the strength of INGO training programs on democratic political culture, including legal education (Fisher 2013).

This has continued. New GROs emerging from INGO support include six Policy Dialogue Platforms and legal aid centers set up by Helvetas for community activists and GRO representatives to speak up about local legal issues and learn to address them. (Third Shadow Report, 2018).

These INGO-GRO connections, plus official international actors such as the EU, have become, if anything, increasingly important,  and are described as “glocalism” by Anja Mihr (2022).

“…the majority of countries…particularly here in Central Asia, are already governed de facto glocally…where governments don’t deliver” on healthcare, education, work, or security…The EU, for example, supports mayoral elections in Central Asia…Governments even failed to intervene in a water dispute in 2021 in the Ferghana Valley between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, so local leaders turned to international actors.

Even the most elementary, basic duty of a state to provide safety and security for its citizens, failed to do. So, the local people resolve the problems themselves with the help of international organizations.

Glocal governance [emerges in] national states which are…corrupt, incapable…particularly when they’re establishing dynasties, then the local and the global will connect and fix the problems.”

Official international organizations supported the 2009 Tajik law prohibiting rural conscription and child labor for cotton harvesting. Rights and Prosperity, the Tajik affiliate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), researches public accountability and transparency, as well as the rights of refugees. (https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/partners/ngodirectory/4ea918d311/international-public-organization-rights-prosperity.html)

The rise of “glocalism” has also helped GROs benefit directly from ties with INGOs. German Agro Action, in collaboration with the World Bank, has a strong record of partnering with both GRSOs and GROs. Its affiliate, Panjaket Agro Action, grew out of  24 community support centers tied to local governments, 91 water user associations, and 10 agricultural cooperatives being trained to train other groups (Karimov, 2018-2019). German Agro Action is currently working on 100 projects in the Rashdt Valley, involving 55,000 people through local organizations.

International support is not always financial and there is, for example,  an ongoing exchange of knowledge on legal issues. The International Commission of Jurists supports the Tajik Union of Lawyers’ work on judicial transparency and the mistreatment of lawyers in detention. The Legal Policy Research Centre, tied to the International Commission of Jurists, is focused on cases in rural areas.

Another important group is the Open Society Foundation, which sponsors the Coalition for Transparency, representing civil society in negotiations with the government and mining firms. OSF has also continued its long-term support for the League of Women Lawyers, groups of parents of disabled children, and increased internet access in rural areas.  OSF initiated the idea of sending caravans of doctors and lawyers to rural areas, which the government then took over and expanded (Open Society Foundation, 2021).

The Eurasia Foundation focuses on climate change and works with local governments and GROs on women’s issues. A current project involves 20 CSOs working on local development with Mahallas and local governments. CSO/Mahalla impact assessments are followed by round tables with governments and media to lobby for rural development (www.ef-ca.tj).

The most important religious INGO in Tajikistan is the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), supported by the liberal Ismaili sect of Islam. AKF supports GROs directly, on a large scale. Its Mountain Societies Development Program operates in the GBAR and is committed to strengthening local civil society as the foundation for development. AKF has worked with thousands of GROs since 1993 to strengthen “value-based societies”, transparency, and political accountability while improving social services and economic assets.

The network represents 1.4 million people and focuses on 2600 local savings groups and Mahallas. Initial efforts based on road repair and electric connections grew into local problem-solving workshops, leading to 3600 micro projects since 2014,  demonstrating “glocalism’s”  potential to link democracy and development.

Democracy and Development

The distinction between human rights, advocacy, and political participation on the one hand, and development (sometimes called “service provision” on the other, is widespread  (Appe, 2017), although causal relationships between democracy and development are complex and move in both directions. Amartya Sen (1998) captured much of this by describing freedom as both the primary object of development and its principal instrument. Similarly,  Booth and Seligson (1978: 261) defined participation as “behavior influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods…which can be supplied by governments or by local communities themselves.”

Although local organizations are rarely involved in international human rights campaigns, the struggle for basic needs is an important form of political participation that leads to socio-economic development projects or services provided by CSOs or the government. An early meta-analysis of 50 projects in the developing world found that participation was the only consistently effective development strategy, as measured by the quality of life results and low project costs. Similar findings were found in urban projects. (Lance and McKenna, 1975;  Cheema, 1986.) 

Socioeconomic benefits can also lead to participation. A microcredit program sponsored by Save the Children Colombia for rural women’s clubs led members to attend not only more club meetings but also Local Development Association meetings previously attended only by men. A corollary is that when people in an entire community receive direct benefits, the resulting participation is broader and less likely to be tied to a political ideology or special interests.

Local, provincial, and national organizations (governmental or nongovernmental) can promote participation, even when the project focus is economic development or service provision.  GRSOs play a “vanguard role” within civil society because they tend to reach out to people left out of the political system at the local level. Tajik GRSOs, however, seem to be less likely than their counterparts in other developing countries to provide the poor with vested interests through micro-enterprise development or local banks. (Fisher, 1998:13-17) INGOs have only partially filled this gap.

Tajik GRO-GRSO relationships in 2006 were focused on both democratization and development. Chasma promoted businesses that supported interactions among women who were initially reluctant to leave their homes. NGO Women Voters worked with women to make political demands on improving basic services (Fisher 2013).

Some GRSOs based on democracy and development in Tajikistan have not survived. Manizha developed 40 training modules on democracy for local organizations and helped them set up their own local technical support organizations,  but the organization did not outlast the death of its founder.

The Public Committee for Democratic Processes (PCDP), the NGO most self-consciously focused on democracy-development linkages, worked in six regions of Tajikistan. It had grown out of the Inter-Tajik Community Dialogue groups established after the Tajik Civil War, with Kettering Foundation support. The first topic chosen by leaders of the PCDP after the Peace Settlement was “the role and influence of local traditional institutions of decision making” because they wanted to assert that what they were doing was democratic and not just Western (Fisher, 2013: 170,181-185). As Ashurboy Imomov of the PCDP observed, “NGOs do best when they concentrate on local democratic traditions and institutions…Democracy is not a governmental affair.”

In Dahana, the local GRO built a greenhouse to grow vegetables that would combat iron deficiency anemia among local women.  Despite its success, “it proved unable to continue getting international funding, perhaps because it was not officially registered. We tried to help with that, but the organization closed down in 2015.”

However, the ideas and activities linking democratization and development continue in other organizations. In the Chignon District of the GBAR, for example, with AKF support, an elected local chair supervises micro-loans, harvesting, and other development projects, while promoting democratization. (https://www.akdn.org/where-we-work/central-asia/tajikistan)

The linkages, led by Mahallas and other GROs, between public talk (deliberative participation) and what Boyt (1996) calls “public work” have led to tangible development projects in many Tajik localities. In some cases, villagers return after becoming educated and increase both participation and development. One individual born in Gharabdara returned and sought election as chairman of the village’s development committee union. Under his initial guidance, drinking water supply lines were constructed and repairs were carried out at the school. His next step was village meetings, including women, that led to regular workshops. As women learned to participate more regularly, they were able to “demonstrate to the government representatives what active and well-organized women we have.” With government funds, the village organization bought a tractor used for crops, constructing a bridge and a medical center. The tractor is also leased to neighboring villages, thus providing a good income for the village. This village combined two ingredients of participation, broad decision-making, and demand-making, which led to a sustainable income for further development.

Indeed, causal relationships between democratization and socio-economic development seem to apply mainly to the grassroots level, since democratization NGOs in Tajikistan are not likely to establish partnerships with other intermediary NGOs focused on development.

A related question, not explored in detail here, is the relationship between development and state-building, based on accountability.  Zharkevich (2010, p. 5), for example, contends that GRO-government ties can play a strategic socio-political role that promotes state capacity. The latter can, of course, further democratization. The legal restrictions against sex trafficking passed by the Tajik government over 20 years ago were the work of the democratization NGOs, but if Mihr (2022) is correct about the focus on glocalism, then state capacity may be a more elusive goal.

State capacity could also develop from sustained demand making, as GROs become political advocates for social services. As Toepler et al (2020:654) emphasize, there is a need for  “remaining sensitive to the blurring of boundaries between social service provisions, advocacy and support for the state and the status quo”. On the other hand, without outside civil society support, GROs are limited in impact, and funding for government-funded local projects is often corrupted. Alliances and cooperation among different kinds of CSOs are important. As Karimov observed, “Tajikistan has reached a point where… the further development of the country, the consolidation of peace and stability depends largely on the degrees of activity of broad sections of the population in building and strengthening civil society.”

Recommendations and Conclusions

Perhaps the clearest and most common recommendation pertaining to both INGOs and GRSOs, in Tajikistan and elsewhere, is the need to strengthen ties with both GROs and local governments to help them focus on both development and democratization from below, even in the face of the national repression of human rights. CSOs and local governments can learn from each other if they are supported in their interactions. Civil society can even have a national impact. An NGO called Ghamkori got village women from a local group to testify at parliamentary hearings, leading to the passage of legislation against domestic violence (Freizer, 2015).

The intermediary level of civil society in Tajikistan is comprised of markets and a sphere of public debate, in addition to CSOs. These three components all need to take much more advantage of the spread of the internet in rural areas. This could translate into either economic development, through support for new businesses, or support for GROs.  Tajikistan’s embattled media could also increase the number of positive stories about GROs without fear of official disapproval.

Whether civil society can impact democratization in a wider sense is, however, a difficult question. Local democracy promotion over 25 years in Tajikistan by the EU and the US has apparently had some success, especially with young people, despite anti-western bias in some Mahallas (Munday: 2018) One example was a 2001-2003 democracy summer camp funded by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Civilization, a Tajik GRSO. In 2006 an IFES staff member observed that they kept up with the students, who have specialized in journalism, political science or sociology.

Whether civil society can impact democratization in a wider sense is, however, a difficult question. Local democracy promotion over 25 years in Tajikistan by the EU and the US has apparently had some success, especially with young people, despite anti-western bias in some Mahallas ( Munday: 2018). One example was a 2001-2003 democracy summer camp funded by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Civilization, a Tajik GRSO. In 2006 an IFES staff member observed that they kept up with the students, who have specialized in journalism, political science, or sociology.

The long-term strength of any CSO depends on a self-conscious commitment to autonomy that is not always present among intermediary NGOs in Tajikistan. Often they do not diversify their financial support, consistently improve technical or management expertise or gain experience in training government officials, all of which can contribute to autonomy. They do seem, however, to have acquired two other basic ingredients of autonomy and, therefore survival vis a vis the state— advancing women and building ties to GROs, which sometimes even includes bringing ordinary people into national campaigns such as combating sex trafficking. (Fisher 1998: 78-79, 158-159).

Tajikistan also demonstrates that the autonomy of GROs themselves not only contributes to a potential mass base for intermediary NGOs but may also be the single most powerful factor keeping civil society alive, especially in repressive contexts. The contrast between top-down authoritarian rule and grassroots democracy at the local level in Tajikistan is remarkable, but probably not unique, given the emerging potential of the internet and the natural ties between democratization and locally-inspired development.

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